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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Plaintiffs/Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on May 31,2005. R. 793. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2-
2(4), Utah Code Ann. 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no controlling regulatory or statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err by failing to excuse potential challenged jurors for 
cause after they manifested prejudices against Plaintiffs who sue doctors and biases in favor 
of doctors, and after these potential jurors expressed opinions that they would not be able to 
fairly consider the evidence in this case, and were Plaintiffs prejudiced because of this? 
2. Did the trial court err by excluding all evidence of admissions made by 
Dr. Zeluff, including statements that he had "jumped the gun" in performing surgery on Mr. 
Woods, that he had "missed something" and thus unnecessarily performed surgery on Mr. 
Woods, and that he "should not have done this surgery," when such statements were highly 
probative of material issues in the case and were not unfairly prejudicial? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 14, 2001, Appellee Gary Zeluff, M.D. performed a right-toe MTP-
implant surgery, which Plaintiffs claim was unnecessary. This surgery was a failure and 
required multiple additional procedures by other surgeons to repair. The unnecessary surgery 
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and subsequent repair surgeries left Steven Woods permanently disabled. At issue in this case 
was whether Dr. Zeluff failed to consider and offer conservative treatments for Mr. Woods' 
right toe pain before recommending and removing Mr. Woods' toe joint and replacing it with 
an implant. Also at issue in the case was whether Dr. Zeluff misdiagnosed Mr. Woods' toe 
pain, whether he failed to refer Mr. Woods to a rheumatologist before considering surgery, 
and whether he incorrectly determined that Mr. Woods was a candidate for MTP-implant 
surgery. 
During a post-operative visit, Dr. Zeluff acknowledged his error in 
recommending and performing the implant surgery, telling Mr. Woods that he had "jumped 
the gun," that at the time he decided to do the surgery he had "missed something," and that 
he "should not have done the surgery." Before trial, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to 
exclude the admissions mentioned above. The trial court granted Defendants' Motion and 
ordered as precluded any and all evidence of Dr. Zeluff s admissions, ruling that the 
probative value of his admissions were substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. Under the judge's ruling, Plaintiffs' were also precluded from using these 
admissions to impeach the Defendant. 
This matter was tried to a jury on April 4-8, 2005. The jury returned their 
verdict on April 8, 2005, finding for the Defendant. During jury selection on April 4,2005, 
potential jurors expressed strong prejudices against attorneys who sue doctors, biases in favor 
of medical doctors, and opinions that they would not be able to fairly consider evidence 
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di II ing the trial / Vppel lants cl: lallenged six potei itial ]\ irors for ca 1 lsebecai lse of bias, bi it the 
Court excused only one of them. A timely notice of appeal was filed. Plaintiff asserts herein 
error in the failure to excuse jurors for cause and in excluding admissions of a party-
opponent, A fie w trial ii 1 tl lis i natter is requested. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The factual statements relevant to this appeal are as follows: 
1 Defense Files Motion to Keep Out Admissions. Oi 1 March 25,2005, 
Defendant Filed a Motion in I .in i ine at id a Memorandi ii i i it i Si lpport R 51 1 561 It: l the 
Motion, Defendants sought to preclude Plaintiffs' use of certain admissions b> Dr. Zeluff 
related to his surgery on Plaintiff. Mr. Woods testified during his deposition as follows; 
Q. Okay. There's a mention in one of the medical records, I believe 
it's Dr. Rasmussen's, that you reported to him that shortly after the surgery Dr. 
Zeluff said something to you to the effect that he should not have replaced the 
joint and should have referred you to an infectious disease specialist. Did you 
report that to Dr. Rasmussen? 
A, I may have, or Dr. Stromquist. That was said to me so I may 
have reported that to any doctor that I have seen. 
Q- Okay. 
A, Tliat is possible. ' 
Q. Tell me everything y ou remember about Dr. Zeluff s comments 
on those issues. 
A I had been seeing Dr. Pilgrim because Dr. Zeluff was out of town 
and when he came back to town his wife originally walked in and told me, I 
told him he shouldn't have done this. And then he shortly afterwards walked 
in and said, I jumped the gun. I don't think we should have done this 
surgery. You need to go see a different doctor. 
Q. And did you ask him any questions about those comments as to 
what he meant by that? 
i\ I started crying. I didn't ask him anything. 
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Q. Did he give you any more information as to what it was that he 
could have done short of surgery? 
A. I've missed something. That's all that I know. He didn't say 
anything else that he could have done. 
Q. When you say I've missed something, did he say that? 
A. He said that. 
Q. He said, I've missed something? 
A. I've missed something. 
Q. And you didn't ask him any clarification about that? 
A. No. I was pretty upset at that point. 
R. 537-38 (emphasis added). 
Defendants argued in their moving papers that the statements were 
inadmissable heresy, that they did not qualify for a hearsay exception, and that they 
improperly suggested Dr. Zeluff was negligent. R. 518-523. Nowhere in their moving papers, 
however, did the Defendants argue that the evidence should be excluded under Rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. R. 808:38. 
2. Plaintiffs Oppose Defendants9 Motion. On April 1, 2005, Plaintiffs 
filed their opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine. R. 568-574. In their opposition, 
Plaintiffs asserted that the statements by Dr. Zeluff were admissions that qualify as 
exceptions to the hearsay rule under Rule 801 (b)(2)A, Utah Rules of Evidence. No Rule 403 
argument was made since none had been offered by Defendants. R. 808:38. 
3. Rule 403 Balancing Introduced by Judge at Hearing. Although the 
defense never even raised the issue, the Court, sua sponte, ruled preliminarily at an April 1, 
2005, hearing on Defendants' Motions in Limine that under Rule 403, Utah Rules of 
-4-
Evidence, that the probative value of Dr. Zeluff s statements was outweighed by its potential 
prejudice. R. 807:3,808:38. 
4. Court Found Admissions Both Relevant and Probative. At the April 
1, 2005, Motion in Limine hearing, the Court found Dr. Zeluff s statements to be both 
relevant ("of course it's relevant to some extent. You can hardly say that's not relevant")and 
to have probative value ("I think it has probative value but very limited probative value"). 
See R. 807:3. Later during the hearing, the Court indicated that the admissions were "highly 
probative of medical negligence" and for this reason they were "highly prejudicial." R. 
807:21 (emphasis added). The Court did not find that the statements to be confusing. R. 
807:9. 
5. Supplemental Briefing Asserts No Rule 403 Preclusion. On April 4, 
2005, Plaintiffs submitted supplemental briefing to address the Rule 403 issue the Court had 
raised. R. 615-620. In this briefing, Plaintiffs vigorously asserted that the statements of Dr. 
Zeluff were highly probative of issues in the case, including whether Dr. Zeluff should have: 
(1) obtained a family history which would have informed him that Mr. Woods was not a 
candidate for surgery, (2) referred Mr. Woods for treatment by a rheumatologist and (3) 
removed a healthy joint upon opening Mr. Woods' toe and discovering the joint was not 
diseased. R. 616. Plaintiffs also asserted that it was only the Plaintiffs who would be unfairly 
prejudiced should the evidence be excluded. R.618. 
-5-
6. Exclusion Order Signed by Court On April 4, 2005, the Court 
preliminarily granted Defendants' Motions in Limine No. 1 (motion to exclude statements), 
reserving the final decision pending supplemental briefing. R. 624. Defendants' Order on 
Defendants' Motions in Limine was signed on this date as well. R. 624-626. The relevant 
portions of the Order read: 
Evidence that Dr. Zeluff said he jumped the gun, missed something, or should 
not have done the subject surgery is inadmissable on the grounds that the 
testimony is minimally probative and is substantially outweighed by the 
dangers of unfair prejudice. If Plaintiffs can come up with something, the 
Court will reconsider the ruling. 
7. Plaintiffs Prevented from Using Admissions for Impeachment. 
During a hearing on the admissions issue held April 5, 2005, Plaintiffs asserted that the 
admissions of Dr. Zeluff could come in as impeachment evidence. R. 807:17-18. The Court 
indicated that these statements could be used for impeachment if they were used "strictly to 
show lack of credibility." Id. The Court indicated it would not allow the admissions to be 
used strictly for standard of care purposes. R. 807:18. The Court did suggest, however, that 
if the Defense asserted that Mr. Woods pushed for the operation, that Dr. Zeluff s statements 
that he "jumped the gun" or "shouldn't have done the surgery" or "I missed something" 
could come in. The Court stated: 
[I]f the Defendant is going to argue or submit evidence that Mr. Woods made 
the decision, he was the primary factor and that is a defense to any malpractice 
claim, then I would almost certainly let you get into the statements.... 
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R. 808:130 (emphasis added). When counsel pointed out that this evidence was already in 
a chart note that the parties had already stipulated to, where Dr. Zeluff wrote that "Steve .. 
. came in today very strongly considering the [procedure]" and that he "has some friends who 
have had this procedure done and it [sic] knows the excellent results it can potentially 
[provide]" (R. 808:130-31), the Court changed its position. Id Its response to counsel was 
that "[y]ou're still not addressing the fundamental legal issue and that's probative value 
versus prejudicial effect. . . ." R. 808:131. The Court subsequently ruled on April 5, 2005, 
that the statements would not come in for any reason. R. 808:132. 
8. Jury Selection, The trial court conducted a general voir dire in the 
courtroom with all the potential jurors, and later adjourned to chambers to conduct individual 
voir dire, with counsel asking questions to probe for bias. R. 808:1-127. As the voir dire for 
each potential juror was concluded, the parties were asked to pass or challenge for cause. The 
Court thereupon ruled on the challenges. Six potential jurors were challenged for cause by 
Plaintiffs due to bias. R. 808:107-119. Only one of these challenges was granted. R. 808:114. 
The remaining five challenges were denied. R. 808:111-115,120,126. Plaintiffs were forced 
to exercise their three peremptory challenges to remove these venire persons from the jury. 
R. 709. 
9. Overall Bias of Jury Pool. The overall makeup of the jury pool was for 
the most part, very anti-plaintiff. Many of the venire had heard discussion concerning tort 
reform and a medical malpractice "crisis" during the recent presidential election when this 
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was a big issue. R. 808:1-11. A significant percentage of the jury venire (20 of 28, or 71%), 
expressed their belief that medical malpractice claims increased medical costs and/or 
insurance rates. R. 808:6-12. Nine of the potential jurors expressed their concern that a 
verdict in Plaintiffs' favor would cost them personally. R. 808:13-15. When potential jurors 
were asked if they would feel comfortable if they were counsel having someone with their 
frame of mind sit on the jury, ten of them indicated they would not. R. 808:18. Concerning 
this question, the defense later commented to the judge: "I was surprised to see so many of 
them raise their hand." R. 808:29. The Court responded: "It's more than I've ever had. Id. 
10. Jurors Challenged for Cause. The following jurors were challenged 
by Plaintiffs for cause: 
a. George Morgan. Potential Juror No. 2 indicated during voir dire 
that he felt that medical malpractice lawsuits have increased the cost of medical care and/or 
insurance: "I feel like medical malpractice insurance was raising our insurance rates." R. 
808:40. He lamented that because of this, his small business has a hard time being able to 
afford health insurance premiums, which he says, "just keep escalating." R. 808:40. Mr. 
Morgan also indicated that given these feelings, he would be unable to follow Court 
instruction concerning the awarding of damages. R. 808:15-16, 22. After some lengthy 
"rehabilitation" by the Court, this juror stated that while he would now not have a problem 
awarding damages if liability was proven, he would be conservative in his award. R. 808:41. 
During voir dire, Mr. Morgan also revealed that his daughter was a defense lawyer and did 
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most of her work for "some big insurance company/' and that he talked with her about her 
cases and her work. R. 80 8:41. The judge then asked him that despite his conservative nature, 
if he was "willing to be able to be at least fair." R. 808:41-42. Mr. Morgan responded with 
a"yes."M 
Because of the bias mentioned above, Mr. Morgan was challenged for cause 
by Plaintiffs. R. 808:107. In response, the Court denied the challenge providing as a basis its 
statement: "I believe he showed himself to be able to be a fair and impartial juror." R. 
808:110-111. Plaintiffs subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse this juror. 
R. 709. 
b. David Moss. Potential Juror No. 3 expressed during voir dire that 
he felt medical malpractice lawsuits have caused the cost of medical care and/or insurance 
to increase. R. 808:12. He further indicated that he would be unable to follow the Court's 
instruction in awarding a fair and impartial verdict given his bias. R. 808:13-16. He also 
revealed that he would be uncomfortable having himself as a juror if he were legal counsel. 
R. 808:18. During in-chambers discussion with Mr. Moss, he admitted his bias: "I know 
nothing about this case but I have a concern about people that are kind ofprofessional 
litigants now looking and trying to just find ways to make money'' R. 808:44 (emphasis 
added). He then stated that this "is a bias that I do carry I think that is potentially, I don't 
want to say damaging, but it's there." R. 808:44 (emphasis added). 
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After some rehabilitation by the Court, which the judge jokingly referred to as 
"beat[ing] up," Mr. Moss responded that he would try to be, in essence, fair. R. 808: 44-45. 
This rehabilitation, however, proved to be elusive as Mr. Moss held firm to his bias against 
awarding damages and was adamant that he would be unable to award a "full amount" of 
damages: 
Q: I think the judge asked you if he ordered you to put that aside, 
would you be able to award a full amount of damages, and you said no. 
A: I think, I guess what I should say is I couldn't just say yes. . . . I 
don }t know that I could just look at you right now and say okay, I will do 
that, I might 
Q: But you're saying you're not sure if you will be able to do 
that? 
A: I couldn't say 100 percent, no, again, just the fact that I think I would 
like to be that way. 
R. 808:45-47 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Moss was subsequently challenged for cause by Plaintiffs. R. 808:111-12. 
The Court in responding to this challenge stated that "Mr. Moss in the courtroom gave me 
concern . . . . " R. 808:111 (emphasis added). The Court then provided its basis for its denial 
of Plaintiffs' challenge: 
He was much more open. He says he likes to think he can be impartial He 
does have a concern about frivolous litigation and professional litigants. He 
cannot award just whatever someone requests but he can weight [sic] the 
evidence and look at it and award what the evidence warrants. 
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R. 808:112. (emphasis added). Because Plaintiffs used up their peremptories excusing other 
jurors they had challenged for cause, they were unable to prevent this person from sitting on 
the jury. R. 709. 
c. Kent Anderson. Potential Juror No. 7 indicated as others before him 
had that he felt malpractice lawsuits had driven up the cost of medical care and/or insurance. 
R. 808:12. He told the Court he was concerned about medical malpractice suits: "it's on the 
news (inaudible) mostly that medical malpractice [awards] are becoming excessive and there 
needs to be something done about it...." R. 808:3-4 (emphasis added). He told the Court 
that his feelings as to the excessiveness of some awards could influence his thinking. He 
stated "I don't really think about it but I think it is a potential problem. I think so." R. 808:4 
(emphasis added). Mr. Anderson later stated that while his bias might not stop him from 
giving an award, it would affect the amount. R. 808:13-14. In chambers, the judge attempted 
to rehabilitate Mr. Anderson as to how his bias would affect a damage award. He then 
admitted his bias: 
The Court: So recognizing that the real issue is is [sic] that your [sic] 
don't tie your damage award to your feelings about increased insurance, cost 
increase of medical, tort crisis whatever. You think you can do that in a single 
case? 
A: I think I could 
The Court: Do you have any doubt about that? Just a little bit about 
the way you said it makes me have to ask it again. 
A: No, you know, Vm concerned but I think in an individual case it 
(inaudible). 
R. 808:55-56. (emphasis added). 
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Later when he was asked whether he would hesitate making a damage award 
based on his bias, he admitted: "well, I think to be perfectly honest, there's a little bit of 
hesitation but I would certainly be open and try to look, you know, at both side[s] and issues. 
R. 808:57-58 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Anderson was also subsequently challenged for cause. R. 808:114. The 
Court denied the challenge for cause and provided as its basis: "The Court believes that Mr. 
Anderson did state a willingness and openness and ability to be a fair and impartial juror and 
the statements you identify do not overcome that. . . ." R. 808:114-15. To keep this juror 
from being empaneled, Plaintiffs were forced to exercise one of their peremptory challenges. 
R. 709. 
d. Douglas McOmie. Potential Juror No. 13, a probation officer by 
profession, indicated during general voir dire that he had a negative impression of attorneys. 
R. 808:28-29,76. He also indicated that he would not be comfortable if he were legal counsel 
having someone like himself sit in judgment on him. R. 808:58. During in-chambers voir 
dire, he acknowledged his concerns regarding increased medical costs or insurance premium 
increases that came from malpractice claims (R. 808:74-76) and expressed his feelings 
concerning those who sue: 
Q: I think you used the word bitter, didn't you, that you had some 
bitter feelings about those who sue? 
A: Yes, and just because of this particular incident that my son has been 
faced with, just the circumstances and I don't know if you want me to go into 
that. 
The Court: If it effects [sic] you we do, if it doesn't[,] fine. 
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A: It [ajffects me. 
R: 808:77 (emphasis added). 
Mr. McCombie then explained that he was upset because someone had sued 
his son concerning a car accident his son was involved in. R. 808:78. He explained that the 
suit was "kind of a shock to everybody" and that "everybody [has] been under some strain" 
because ofit.R. 808:78. 
His feelings on this issue were probed by Plaintiffs' attorneys: 
Q: Do you think that experience would tend to influence the way you 
view this case particularly since we're the ones, we attorneys right here have 
brought suit against this doctor, do you think you'd tend to look less favorably 
on us and our case? 
A: That's hard to say. I think it's possible. It's possible it may. 
R. 808:77-78 (emphasis added). Following this revelation of bias, defense counsel attempted 
to rehabilitate him with argumentative questioning: 
Q: Mr. McCobie, do you think that you could sit throughout this trial for 
the next several days putting aside prior experiences, your son's experience 
and listen to the evidence and listen to the instructions on the law and apply the 
law to the evidence in making a decision about this case and this case alone if 






I can certainly try. 
You would make every attempt to do that? 
Yes, I would try. 
And you believe you'd be capable of doing that? 
Ahhh, I would hope so. I can't say for sure but I would hope that I 
could. 
R. 808:79 (emphasis added). Even these efforts showed that this person's deep-seated biases 
remained firmly entrenched. 
-13-
This juror was naturally challenged for cause by Plaintiffs. The Court in 
responding to this challenge responded: "/ am really on the fence on this man and it's 
mostly that I'm worried against about his distraction" (recent difficulties in his life, including 
a daughter's upcoming marriage, financial problems and marital stress). R. 808:75, 116 
(emphasis added). After the judge was "rehabilitated" by defense counsel regarding the 
irrelevancy of distraction in this juror's life, and after he heard defense's claim that "we're 
getting down to a number situation," the judge announced: "I don't think there's cause, as 
I say certainly not in terms of any bias." R. 808:116-17. Plaintiffs subsequently burned up 
yet another peremptory challenge excusing this "bitter" juror. R. 709. 
e. Robert Wilkey. Potential Juror No. 20, is an EMS helicopter pilot 
who had served ten years active duty in the Army. R. 808:93. He expressed a strong bias 
from the start when the Court during voir dire inquired as to whether prospective jurors felt 
malpractice cases affected medical care or insurance. R. 808:6-7, 9, 87. At that time he 
stated: 
I've heard about a consortium of Las Vegas OB/GYN doctors who no longer 
are taking patients due to the malpractice situation they have and ongoing 
stuff. With my affiliation with the University of Utah Medical Center and 
hearing people there talk about it, so I've heard a lot about i t . . . . 
R. 808:9. 
The Court then had the following discussion with Mr. Wilkey: 
The Court: Okay. So you've heard quite a lot. Has it left you unable 
to be a fair and impartial juror or do you think you can still -
A: / must say I'm somewhat tainted on the subject 
-14-
The Court: Somewhattainted? Fair enough. It's something that's been 
on over quite a period for you it sounds like? 
A: Yes. 
R. 808:9 (emphasis added). 
This juror's belief that a Plaintiffs verdict would make his insurance rates go 
up was such that he expressed that he would be unable to put aside these feelings to render 
a fair and impartial verdict. R. 808:13-14. He also indicated to the Court that he had negative 
feelings about lawyers who represent patients (R. 808:17), that he would not be comfortable 
sitting in judgment on himself (R. 808:18) and that he had a bias in favor of those in the 
military. R. 808:18,91. 
When the judge and counsel retired into chambers, the Court provided its initial 
impression of Mr. Wilkey: 
The Court: Robert Wilkey, to tell you the truth, if one of you made 
a motion, I'd probably grant it because I think the guy is desperately trying 
to be negative. We'll bring him in here we'll get another ten minutes of it. 
R. 808:32 (emphasis added). 
The Court then had the following conversation with defense counsel, who 
appeared interested in protecting Wilkey from a for-cause challenge: 
The Court: Do you want to see him? 
Defense: Yes, Your Honor, because I think if you get him in here-
The Court: He just might straighten up. I don't think he will. 
Defense: He '11 straighten up and fly right. 
R. 808:32 (emphasis added). 
The Court expressed its doubt that this juror would "straighten up": 
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The Court: But I cannot say that it's impossible to turn him around 
but-
Plaintiff: He said he was tainted. 
The Court: Oh, he's even got the military issue. What did he miss? 
Defense: Well, the military -
The Court: He starts out somewhat tainted after he has some strong 
feelings and then he does the damage issue and then he has issues of toes, his 
father, father's got arthritis, he's negative about lawyers and he's biased about 
the military. 
R. 808:32. 
Mr. Wilkey was even more forthcoming regarding his bias when he was 
brought into chambers. Once there, he discussed his desire for tort reform, including damage 
caps (R. 808:88) and presented the following diatribe against those who bring medical 
negligence actions: 
Medical science is not an exact science. Things happen, things do happen and 
people, I think, do honestly try to do their best and / think malpractice and 
neglect are very strong words and proving true malpractice I think is a 
difficult thing and I think it's just, you know, positive outcomes aren't always 
the case and you can't be guaranteed a positive outcome. And so, a lot of times 
when people don't get a positive outcome they just say it was the doctor's 
fault. 
R. 808:88 (emphasis added). 
After he was told that defendant Dr. Zeluff served in the National Guard, Mr. 
Wilkey came clean on his bias in favor of those who serve in the military: 
The Court: I guess Dr. Zeluff has served in the Guard, would that 
make any difference to you? 
A: I mean / do like prior service people. I mean, I tend to kind of, 
J don't want to say side with them, hut I can understand where they're 
coming from, I understand their thinking process, their mentality. 
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R. 808:91 (emphasis added). 
Despite the Court's initial (correct) impressions about Mr. Wilkey's hopeless 
bias, it denied Plaintiffs' challenge for cause, providing as its sole basis: "most critically to 
me he seemed extremely open to following instruction." R. 808:119-120. 
With Plaintiffs' peremptories used up, Plaintiffs were unable to remove this 
juror and he was empaneled with others in deciding this case - against Mr. Woods. 
f. Ryan Duckworth. Potential juror No. 6 was the only juror challenged 
for bias that was actually excused for cause by the Court. His bias was revealed during 
general voir dire when he indicated he felt medical malpractice claims were increasing 
medical and/or insurance costs and that his feelings on this would affect his ability to be fair 
in awarding damages if there was a basis for such an award. R. 808:49. During continued in-
chambers voir dire with this juror, Mr. Duckworth told the Court: "To be honest, if I were 
going in at this point, I would probably be in favor of the doctor because [another] doctor 
saved my daughter's foot." R. 808:50. When the Court told him that all the Plaintiffs had to 
do was "tip the scale just a little bit so you believe it's more likely than not that the doctor 
was negligent" this juror responded that "he'd have to prove it without a shadow of doubt" 
R. 808:52 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs moved to have Mr. Duckworth struck for cause. R. 808:113. The 
Court granted Plaintiffs' request, stating that because of his firm, favorable bias toward 
doctors, the challenge was legitimate. R. 808:114. 
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11. Dr. Zeluff Disposes of Toe Joint. At trial, Defendant Dr. Zeluff 
testified that he did not remove a healthy joint from Mr. Woods' body. R. 808:209. He 
testified that the joint was diseased. R. 808:211. He also testified that following the joint's 
removal, that he sent it to pathology "for disposal" and that he chose not to have it analyzed 
by a third party. R. 808:188, 210. Nowhere in the record did he record the condition of the 
joint. R. 808:190. Dr. Zeluff testified that it would be a breach of the standard of care if he 
removed an undamaged joint. R. 808:193. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL 
TO EXCUSE FIVE POTENTIAL JURORS FOR CAUSE DUE TO BIAS. 
A, The Law of Excusing Jurors for Cause. Litigants are entitled to a jury 
that is fair and impartial. West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, ^ 12, 103 P. 3d 708. The Court of 
Appeals has held that voir dire questions must be allowed "so as to allow counsel to 
intelligently exercise peremptory challenges." Davis v. Grand County Service Area, dba 
Allen Memorial Hospital 905 P.2d 988, 993 (Utah 1995). 
Rule 47(f)(6) of the Utah Rules of Procedure, provides the applicable 
guidelines for removing a juror for cause. According to the Rule, removal is required when 
"[cjonduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances . . . reasonably lead the Court to 
conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if 
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challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and will act impartially and fairly." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6) (emphasis added). Voir dire responses which expose a juror's bias 
or partiality, "give rise to a presumption that a potential juror is biased, and the juror must 
be dismissed unless that presumption is rebutted.". Furthermore, "[o]nce statements are 
made during voir dire that 'facially raise a question of partiality or prejudice, an abuse of 
discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court or 
counsel investigates farther and finds the inference rebutted.'" West, 2004 UT 97 at *f 14, 
accord State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 27, 24 P.3d 948. 
The Court in West went on to describe how a presumption of bias or partiality 
may be rebutted: 
Rebutting a presumption of bias or partiality may be accomplished if the 
challenged juror, upon further questioning, provides reason to believe that her 
previous statements showing evidence of bias were "merely the product of a 
' light impression' and not one that would' close the mind against the testimony 
that may be offered in opposition.'" Under our case law, however, a 
presumption of bias cannot be rebutted solely by a juror's bare assurance of 
her own impartiality because a challenged juror cannot reasonably be 
expected to judge her own fitness to serve. The trial court must focus on the 
juror's expressions of attitudes, opinions, and feelings about subjects related 
to the case, rather than on the juror's assessment of her own objectivity. "A 
statement made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much 
of its meaning in light of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias. 
West, 2004 UT 97, ^ f 15 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court's instruction in West is supported by the Advisory 
Committee note to Rule 47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 
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Paragraph (f)(6). The Utah Supreme Court has noted a tendency of trial court 
judges to rule against a challenge for cause in the face of legitimate questions 
about a juror's biases. The Supreme Court limited the following admonition 
to capital cases, but it is a sound philosophy even in trials of lesser 
consequence. 
In determining challenges for cause, the task of the judge is to find the proper 
balance. It is not the judge's duty to seat a jury from a too-small venire panel 
or to seat a jury as quickly as possible. Although thorough questioning of a 
juror to determine the existence, nature and extent of a bias is appropriate, it 
is not the judge's duty to extract the "right" answer from or to "rehabilitate" 
a juror. The judge should accept honest answers to understood questions and, 
based on that evidence, make the sometimes difficult decision to seat only 
those jurors the judge is convinced will act fairly and impartially. 
• • • 
The objective of a challenge for cause is to remove from the venire panel 
persons who cannot act impartially in deliberating upon a verdict. The lack of 
impartiality may be due to some bias for or against one of the parties; it may 
be due to an opinion about the subject matter of the action or about the action 
itself. 
The amendments focus on the state of mind clause. In determining whether a 
person can act impartially, the Court should focus not only on that person's 
state of mind but should consider the totality of the circumstances. These 
circumstances might include the experiences, conduct, statements, opinions, 
or associations of the juror. Rather than determining that the juror is 
"prevented" from acting impartially, the Court should determine whether the 
juror "is not likely to act impartially." These amendments conform to the 
directive of the Supreme Court: If there is a legitimate question about the 
ability of a person to act impartially, the court should remove that person 
from the panel. 
This new standard for challenges for cause represents a balance more easily 
stated than achieved. These amendments encourage judges to exercise greater 
care in evaluating challenges for cause and to resolve legitimate doubts in 
favor of removal. This may mean some jurors now removed by peremptory 
challenge will be removed instead for cause. It may also mean the Court will 
have to summon more prospective jurors for voir dire. Whether lawyers will 
use fewer peremptory challenges will have to await the judgment of 
experience. 
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Rule 47, Advisory Committee Note (emphasis added). 
Mr. Woods lost his original toe joint due to Dr. Zeluff s negligence. This trial 
was his only opportunity to get justice. It was thus crucial that he got a fair jury. Because 
Plaintiff raised legitimate questions as to six of the potential jurors' beliefs and biases, all six 
of these jurors should have been struck for cause. See State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 650 
(Utah 1995). As it turns out, only one of these six was excused. 
B. Excusing Challenged Jurors for Potential Bias. Failure to excuse a 
juror for cause in a medical malpractice case, when cause exists, which forces the Plaintiff 
to use a peremptory challenge to strike that juror, is reversible error. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 
P.2d 533 (Utah 1981). 
The law of Saunders II, a child sexual abuse case, is instructive for the Court 
in this case. In Saunders II, the Defendant claimed reversible error based upon the failure to 
remove one juror for cause. State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1995). In 
response to the question about whether she could be fair and impartial in deciding the case, 
the juror stated, "It wouldn't prevent me. It might make me uncomfortable. " (This is similar 
to the expressions of doubt about being fair held by jurors in this case. See Facts lOa-e.) The 
trial court apparently then "rehabilitated" the juror and refused to excuse her for cause, which 
resulted in a peremptory challenge being used up. The Court of Appeals upheld a verdict 
against the Defendant on the basis that the Defendant would have to show that the failure to 
remove that juror "actually prejudiced his case." Id. The Supreme Court reversed, first 
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addressing whether the juror should have been dismissed for cause, and then whether the 
error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court observed, as to "cause": 
What is important is that she stated that her prior experience would make her 
uncomfortable in deciding this case. We certainly do not impugn her honesty 
and integrity when we refuse to take her answer to be dispositive of her 
qualification to sit. . . . What is important is that despite her sincere 
commitment to be fair, it was clearly possible that her personal traumatic 
experience might affect her neutrality in some way because, as she stated, 
making a decision would make her "uncomfortable" for reasons that went 
beyond the discomfort that many jurors experience when rendering judgment. 
Saunders II, 992 P.2d at 964 (emphasis added). 
This "uncomfortable" feeling is comparable to how jurors in this case felt about 
sitting in judgment on a medical doctor. In this case, for example, Mr. Morgan, Juror No. 2, 
indicated during voir dire that he would not feel comfortable following the Court's 
instruction concerning the awarding of damages. See Fact 10a. Potential Juror No. 3, David 
Moss, expressed the same reservation and indicated that he would be unable to follow the 
Court's instruction to award a fair and impartial verdict, should he find negligence, given his 
feelings about how medical malpractice lawsuits have affected the cost of medical care 
and/or insurance. See Fact 10b. Mr. Moss also revealed that the bias he had concerning 
"professional litigants" would carry over into this trial and that this could be "potentially 
damaging" to Plaintiffs. See Id. Juror No. 7, Kent Anderson, similarly stated that his feeling 
as to the excessiveness of some awards could influence how he sees this case. See Fact 10c. 
He called these feelings a "potential problem" and that there would be "a little bit of 
hesitation" in any verdict he might render. See Id. Another juror, Douglas McOmie, Juror No. 
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13, stated his feelings even more emphatically than did the problem juror in Saunders II, 
when he stated that he felt "bitter" toward those who sue. See Fact lOd. Finally, Juror No. 
20 actually stated that he was "tainted" when it came to medical malpractice claims. See Fact 
lOe. 
Predictably, the above jurors, after some "rehabilitation" by the Court, stated 
that they would try to be fair. Under existing precedent, however, this is not good enough. 
See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, % 49, 55 P.3d 573 ("a juror's subsequent statements that 
she can be impartial will not of itself attenuate at the inference of bias."); Crawford v. 
Manning, 542 P.2d 1091,1092 (Utah 1975) ("one doubts that a person harbors strong feeling 
concerning anyone who would sue to recover money for the death of another could be a fair 
and impartial juror."). None of the feelings expressed by those challenged for cause were 
"light impressions." See West, 2004 UT 97, If 15. The presumption of bias went therefore 
unrebutted and the Court erred in refusing to remove any of these jurors for cause. See Facts 
lOa-e. 
C. New Trial Warranted. In order to determine whether a new trial is 
warranted for failure to dismiss a juror for cause, a two-part test is applied. See State v. 
Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 25,24 P.3d 948. The court in Wach enunciated this test as follows: (1) 
Did the trial court exceed its discretion when it failed to excuse a prospective juror for 
cause?, and (2) Did the failure to strike a prospective juror actually amount to prejudice to 
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the party seeking a new trial? Id. at ^ 16. These factors when applied to this case warrant a 
new trial. 
First, the trial court committed error by failing to excuse for cause prospective 
jurors who had voiced feelings of bias. See Fact 10. As discussed above, because the Court 
failed to excuse the five jurors challenged for bias, Plaintiffs used their peremptory 
challenges, and were thus prevented from striking others with less severe biases and/or 
conservative viewpoints. According to the jury list, five jurors remained after the alternate, 
Devin Tew, was taken. R.709-710. These persons would have been acceptable substitute 
jurors for those that the Court should have struck for cause. 
Second, because of the large amount of persons who expressed bias, Plaintiffs 
were unable to remove all those who should have been removed by the Court. Specifically, 
jurors Moss and Wilkey did not make "the cut." See Facts 10(b) and 10(e). So, in the end, 
an individual who suspected that the Woods were "professional litigants" and who initially 
said he could not follow the Court's instruction on awarding fair damages was seated 
alongside a medical professional who from the outset said he was "tainted" against those who 
bring medical malpractice claims and had expressed strong bias in favor of those who serve 
in the military as Dr. Zeluff had. See Id. These two were combined with six others who for 
the most part had expressed conservative, anti-Plaintiff views. (Recall that a majority of the 
jury pool felt that medical malpractice claims increased medical and/or insurance costs. See 
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Fact 9.) Plaintiffs were doomed with this jury from the start. A new trial is clearly warranted 
under the circumstances. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE PROBATIVE OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE. 
A. Admissions by Defendant-Doctor Are Relevant Relevant evidence 
is defined as evidence which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence." Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence. The offered statements are 
those made by Dr. Zeluff to plaintiff Steven Woods and include admissions that: (1) he had 
"jumped the gun" [in doing the surgery], (2) should not have done the surgery and (3) he 
"missed something." See Fact 1. The Court found these statements to be relevant. See Fact 
4. 
B. Admissions of Party-Opponents Are Not Hearsay. Utah Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) states that a "statement is not hearsay if... [t]he statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) the party }s own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity" (emphasis added). The Advisory Committee's Note to Evidence 
Rule 801 states: "A party's own statement is the classic example of an admission." 4 
Weinstein's Evidence at 801 -41 (1981). Weinstein, supra, para. 801 (d)(2)(A)[01 ] states: 'All 
that is required is that the statements have been made by the party . . . and that it be 
introduced by an adverse party as in some way relevant - usually because it is contrary to 
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a position that he is now taking." (Emphasis added.) Thus, at a threshold level, the statements 
offered by Plaintiff concerning Dr. Zeluff come in as admissions by Defendant Dr. Zeluff, 
a party-opponent in this action. 
C. Rule 403 Does Not Preclude Use of Zeluff s Statements. The basis 
of the Court's exclusion of Defendant's admissions was that "the testimony is minimally 
probative and is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice." See Order on 
Defendants' Motions in Limine, R. 625 (emphasis added). As indicated above, the Court 
never ruled that the evidence was irrelevant or that it was hearsay. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
(Emphasis added.) Because these statements were clearly probative and were not unfairly 
prejudicial, it was error to exclude them 
1. Statements Highly Probative. The Advisory Committee notes to the 
parallel Federal Rule 403, state that "when the evidence is clearly relevant to a crucial issue 
in the case, the prejudicial effect of putting it before the jury would have to be substantial, 
indeed, to warrant its exclusion under Rule 403. Advisory Committee Note § 403.6 to Rule 
403, Federal Rules of Evidence (emphasis added). 
The statements excluded by the trial court went directly to whether Dr. Zeluff 
breached the standard of care. This evidence, combined with that of Plaintiffs' expert 
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orthopaedic surgeon, would tend to prove that Dr. Zeluff did in fact "jump the gun" when 
he performed the surgery when there were other less-invasive treatments and procedures that 
could and should have been implemented. His statement that he in essence should not have 
done the surgery similarly provides further support for Plaintiffs' position that the toe joint 
removal procedure was unnecessary in light of other options that Mr. Woods had. These were 
not statements expressing remorse. They went to the Defendant's own assessment of the 
surgery he performed - a key issue in this case. They are also probative for impeachment 
purposes, for countering assertions by Dr. Zeluff, a named expert in Defendants' case, that 
Mr. Woods' surgery was medically indicated. 
Dr. Zeluff s statement that he had "missed something" is also probative of what 
the actual toe joint looked like when he performed the surgery. Dr. Zeluff claimed at trial that 
the toe joint he removed was damaged. Fact 11. Plaintiffs claimed that it was a healthy joint. 
Id. Unfortunately, Dr. Zeluff nowhere described the condition of the joint and ordered the 
pathology department to dispose of it. Id. The admission that he "missed something" as well 
as his statement that he should not have done the surgery goes directly to what Dr. Zeluff saw 
when he performed the operation. These statements are critical as rebuttal and/or 
impeachment of Dr. Zeluff s position as to these issues. 
The Court's exclusion of these statements is surprising given that it agreed that 
the statements were probative. See Fact 4. Indeed, even though the Court seemed conflicted 
on how Dr. Zeluff s statements could be interpreted ("was he commenting on standard of 
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care or was he just expressing remorse, sorrow, embarrassment[?]"), it found that the 
statements were "highly probative of medical negligence . . . ." R. 807:7, 21 (emphasis 
added). Plaintiffs fully agree with this appraisal. 
2. Statements Not Unfairly Prejudicial. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial 
if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by improper means, if it appeals to 
the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise 
causes a jury to base its decision on something other than the facts of the case. Terry v. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds. Relevant 
evidence will, of necessity, be prejudicial, else it would not be relevant. See e.g., United 
States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2004) (involving federal counterpart to URE 
403). 
The prejudicial effect in this case would be that the statements amount to an 
admission of negligence by Dr. Zeluff. While such admissions can be said to be prejudicial, 
they cannot be said to be unfairly prejudicial. They are, after all, the witness' own statements. 
And the statements go to a "crucial" issue in this case: was Dr. Zeluff negligent? There is no 
basis to suggest that using these statements in trial against the Defendant would be unfair. 
In reality, it was unfair to keep the Plaintiffs from using them. 
The Defendants' claim that these admissions would be unduly prejudicial is 
similar to the claim made by the Defendant in State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 27 P.2d 1115. In 
that case, the defendant tried to keep out a statement he had made to a friend wherein he 
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stated that he would not be implicated in his wife's death because he had been the "perfect 
husband" for the past year. Id. at If 64. Although this statement was certainly prejudicial, it 
was found to be highly probative of his involvement in his wife's murder and was not 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id., see also State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525 
(Utah App.1990), cert, denied 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (allowing in audio-taped 
admission of accused pornographer to show method of producing and distributing films, 
where the probative value of the evidence was not found outweighed by undue prejudice). 
3. Balancing Analysis Favors Plaintiffs. Advisory Committee notes to 
Federal Rule 403 state that the balancing the trial court makes "should be the result of 
according the proffered evidence the maximum reasonable probative value and the 
minimum reasonable prejudicial value" Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403, Federal 
Rules of Evidence, § 403.6 (emphasis added). In this balancing process, there is a bias in 
favor of admitting relevant evidence. See United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 795 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) ("Rule 403 tilts, as do the rules as a whole, toward the admission of evidence in 
closer cases"). 
If the statements in this case were accorded the "maximum reasonable 
probative value," they would be seen as admissions by Dr. Zeluff that he had performed the 
toe joint replacement surgery when it was not medically indicated and that he had otherwise 
operated below the applicable standard of care. The statements would, the language of the 
trial court, be "highly probative of medical negligence." R. 807:21. And although the 
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statements would be prejudicial to Defendants, they would not be unfairly prejudicial. 
It is reversable error when a trial court excludes evidence to a party's harm and 
detriment. Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App. 229, f 15, 984 P.2d 404. An error is harmful if 
it is "reasonably likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id. Because 
the Court erred in performing this balance and excluded critical evidence, Plaintiffs were 
prejudiced. Plaintiffs are there entitled to a new trial so that this evidence may be presented 
to a jury. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs were entitled to a fair jury, not one contaminated with bias. This was 
an openly outspoken group who were hostile to and/or had strong feelings against medical 
malpractice claims. It was therefore crucial for Plaintiffs to exclude biased individuals from 
the jury. As it stood, Plaintiffs ran out of peremptories and were unable to remove two biased 
persons from the jury. Plaintiffs were therefore prejudiced and a new trial is warranted. 
It was also error for the Court to exclude admissions previously made by 
Defendant Dr. Zeluff at trial. These admissions went to the heart of Plaintiffs' claims and 
were highly probative of key issues in the case. Although there would be some prejudice to 
Defendants by including this evidence, it would not be evidence that could be considered 
unfair prejudice. The verdict should therefore be overturned and a new trial ordered. 
Dated this day of December, 2005 
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ir RON J. KRAMEf 
MATTHEW H. RATY 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Attorneys for Defendants Gary R. Zeluff, M.D., 
Gary R. Zeluff, M.D., P.C., and 
Utah Orthopaedic Associates 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN WOODS and ; 
STACEY WOODS, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
GARY R. ZELUFF, M.D., ] 
GARY R. ZELUFF, M.D., P.C.; and ] 
UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES, ; 
p.c. ; 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
) IN LIMINE 
• Judge: Robert K. Hilder 
) Case No.: 020906170 MP 
Defendants filed Motions in Limine on or about March 25, 2005. Plaintiffs opposed that 
motion on or about April 1, 2005. The Court heard oral argument on the motions on April 1, 
2005. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel, Ronald J. Kramer and Matthew Raty; defendants 
were represented by counsel, Catherine M. Larson. Each party was afforded the opportunity to 
Third Judicial District 
APR 0 h ?»W5 
B&mty Clark 
argue their respective positions on the pending motions. The Court having reviewed the briefs 
filed by the parties, entertained oral argument and for good cause appearing, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Court reserves final decision on Motion in Limine No. 1. At present, Motion 
No. 1 is granted. Evidence that Dr. Zeluff said that he jumped the gun, missed 
something, or should not have done the subject surgery is inadmissible on the 
grounds that the testimony is minimally probative and is substantially outweighed 
by the dangers of unfair prejudice. If Plaintiffs can come up with something, the 
Court will reconsider this ruling. 
2. The Court grants Motion in Limine No. 2 by stipulation of the parties. Evidence 
from Diane Depew regarding criticisms made by Dr. Pilgram as to the care 
rendered to Mr. Woods by Dr. Zeluff is inadmissible at trial. 
3. The Court denies Motion in Limine No. 3. 
4. The Court denies Motion in Limine No. 4,but will require witnesses testifying as 
to the issues of back, hip and knee problems to satisfy the Court that there is 
sufficient foundation to render such opinions. 
5. The Court grants Motion in Limine No. 5 by stipulation of the parties. Evidence 
of standard of care opinions by Dr. Lynn Rasmussen are inadmissible at trial, 
unless Defendant "opens the door" on this issue, at which point the Court must be 
alerted and rule on that issue prior to any further inquiry on the subject. 
DATED this jfi "day of April, 2005. 
BYTH; 
3 S£§%*>~ b,x\ • 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I here by certify that on the day of April 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE was served, via facsimile, 
to: 
Ronald J. Kramer 
11576 South State Street, Suite 501 
Draper City, Utah 84020 
Matthew Raty 
480 East 400 South, # 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Attorneys for Defendants Gary R. Zeluff, M.D. and 
Utah Orthopaedic Associates 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN WOODS and ] 
STACEY WOODS, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
GARY R. ZELUFF, M.D., ] 
GARY R. ZELUFF, M.D., P.C.; and ] 
UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES, ] 
P.C.. 
Defendants. ) 
i JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
i Judge: Robert K. Hilder 
I Case No.: 020906170 MP 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding, on April 4-8,2005, a jury of 
eight men and women having been duly empaneled, the Plaintiffs appearing personally and by 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 0 2 2005 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Dopiity Cterk'' 
and through their counsel, Ron J. Kramer and Matthew H. Raty, and Defendant appearing 
personally and by and through counsel, Philip R. Fishier and Catherine M. Larson of the law firm 
Strong & Hanni, the parties having presented their evidence and arguments, and the jury having 
duly deliberated and having answered the following special interrogatory in reaching their 
verdict: 
1. Considering all the evidence in this case, did the Defendant, Gary R. Zeluff, M.D., 
breach the applicable standard of care? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
Based upon the foregoing response of the jury to the special interrogatories, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant be and the same is 
hereby awarded judgment of no cause of action on the Plaintiffs' Complaint, thereby dismissing 
Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendantwith prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this &< ~* day of>{5fii, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
HpafahlYRobert K. Hlkfer 
District Court Judge ,(\f $> V 
*\ 
2 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
By: / Lnl 
& Mark C: McLachlan 
Ron J. Kramer 
Matthew H. Raty 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1544 223 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the _ Z J i _ day of April, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Mark C. McLachlan, Esquire 
MARK C. McLACHLAN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
480 East 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ron J. Kramer, Esquire 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
11576 South State Street, Suite 501 
Draper City, UT 84020 
Matthew H. Raty, Esquire 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
480 East 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TXlrvi s *> \xhimuj). 
1544.223 
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